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GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, DEMOCRACY, AND
THE RULE OF LAW
W. Bradley Wendel*
INTRODUCTION: GETTING THE CLICHtS OUT OF THE WAY

What does it mean for a government actor to lack the quality of
independence? Specifically, in connection with government lawyers, how
should we understand core evaluative notions like the distinction between
neutrality and partisanship? These terms are used casually as epithets-the
Bush Justice Department's independence was "shattered," says one former
government lawyer,1 and the Department's process of vetting job
candidates was widely decried as "politicized" or ideological. 2 Naturally
the other side uses the same terms of abuse. The Republican Party, in its
2000 platform, complained bitterly that "[a]n administration that lives by
evasion, coverup, stonewalling, and duplicity has given us a totally
discredited Department of Justice ... [and] the unprecedented politicization
of decisions regarding both personnel and investigations." 3 This sort of
distinction, between politicization and impartiality, is not only familiar in
contemporary rhetoric, but has a long historical pedigree.
George
Washington is reported to have wanted a neutral expounder of the law
instead of a political advisor when he selected the nation's first Attorney
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. Thanks to the participants in the Yale Legal Theory
Workshop, workshops at Georgetown University Law Center, Queen's University Faculty of
Law, and Dalhousie Law School, and the Cornell Law School faculty retreat, for their
helpful comments and criticism. For feedback above and beyond the call of duty, I am
grateful to Jules Coleman, Tsvi Kahana, Daniel Markovits, Jeff Rachlinski, Mark Suchman,
and Alice Woolley.
1. See Tony Mauro, Justice Department's Independence "Shattered," Says Former
DOJ Attorney, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=11764
55062969.
2. For a typical attack on the George W. Bush administration, see John S. Koppel, OpEd., Bush Justice Is a National Disgrace, DENVER POST, July 9, 2007, at 1E (DOJ civil
appellate attorney lambasting episodes of "politiciz[ation]," including the pardon of Scooter
Libby, the abuse of warrantless surveillance, and the firing of U.S. Attorneys).
3. The American Presidency Project, Republican Party Platform of 2000,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849 (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). Ted
Olson-who was then former Reagan administration Office of Legal Counsel head, and
subsequently would serve as President George W. Bush's Solicitor General-also excoriated
the politicization of the Clinton DOJ, including the FBI investigation of the White House
travel office and alleged interference with the investigation of the death of Vince Foster. See
Theodore B. Olson, Politicizingthe Justice Department, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE WAKE
OF CLINTON 151, 252 (Roger Pilon ed., 2000).
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General. 4 In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Gerald Ford similarly
lamented that "the Justice Department had become increasingly politicized
for a quarter of a century. But the 5problem had reached crisis proportions
by the time [he] became President."
Although the rhetorical power of this distinction is apparent, one does not
have to push the analysis very far before the line between impartial decision
making and bias becomes uncertain. One reason for this is the fairly banal
point that all government policies discriminate in some way, and many
discriminate on the basis of contestable values. It cannot be the case that
government decision making has been impermissibly politicized just
because the basis for the decision happens to line up with the policy
In fact, considerations of
preferences of the incumbent President.
democratic accountability would seem to favor this outcome. Not only do
government policies discriminate, but government decision makers act on
the basis of reasons that may also overlap with the preferences of one side
or the other of a political divide. If it is "partisanship" to base a decision on
grounds that are congenial to Republicans and not to Democrats, or vice
versa, then it would appear that most decisions made by government
officials are partisan. Therefore, there would seem to be no way to criticize
coherently a government actor for lacking the virtue of neutrality.
Unsurprisingly, terms like neutrality, independence, politicization, and
partisanship are6 woefully undertheorized in the literature on government
lawyers' ethics.
The basic problem of the ethical responsibilities of government lawyers
is easy to state, and generally well understood: the President has an
agenda. 7 People vote for presidential candidates in part on the basis of
4. See Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspectivefrom
the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303, 1308 (2000).
5. See Gerald R. Ford, In Memoriam: Edward H. Levi, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 975, 975

(2000).
6. i do not mean that we cannot identify blatant examples of political inference with
what should be an impartial process of decision making. For example, Colonel Morris
Davis, the former chief prosecutor in the military commissions at Guantdnamo Bay, resigned
after being placed under the command of William J. Haynes, the civilian general counsel of
the Department of Defense, who had previously indicated that acquittals in the commission
hearings would be intolerable. When Colonel Davis noted there had been acquittals at
Nuremberg, Haynes responded, "If we've been holding these guys for so long, how can we
explain letting them get off? We can't have acquittals. We've got to have convictions." See
Ross Tuttle, Rigged Trials at Gitmo, NATION, Feb. 20, 2008, at 4, 4; see also Morris D.
Davis, AWOL Military Justice, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A15; William Glaberson, ExGuantanamo Prosecutor to Testify for Detainee, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2008, at A18. If the

concept of politicized decision making means anything, this must be an instance of it. The
problem I want to pursue in this essay is that in interesting cases, not involving the exercise
of raw coercive power and obvious rigging of procedures, we do not have a promising way
to theorize the notion of politicization.
7. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the
Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of the Role of Government Lawyers in the
Development of Constitutional Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 61, 66
("American Presidents must, as a practical matter, have some kind of program for the
Supreme Court and for the legal system as a whole. ... [A]II Presidents must, as a political
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ideology. The winner of the election justifiably believes that he has a
mandate from voters to pursue a particular political agenda. The President
accordingly selects executive branch officials on the basis of their fealty to
this agenda-again, not just because it is the President's agenda, but
because the content of the agenda has been set by a democratically
legitimate process. The responsibility of these officials is, in part, to serve
as agents of the President, faithfully executing the President's agenda. 8 At
the same time, however, all government officials have an obligation of
fidelity to the U.S. Constitution and the laws of the United States. The
President takes a constitutionally specified oath to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States."9 Executive branch officials
similarly are required to swear to support the Constitution. 10 Lawyers
advise all of these executive branch officials on how to act in compliance
with the law. In a certain sense, to be explored in depth in this paper,
federal government lawyers have a duty of impartiality or neutrality with
respect to the Constitution and the framework of laws enacted by Congress
pursuant to its constitutional authority. " Government lawyers who deviate
too much from their obligation of fidelity to the law are criticized for
"politicizing" their conduct, implying that it is possible to construct
standards of impartiality that may be used as normative benchmarks.
The deeper theoretical problem, of which our inability to coherently
sustain the "politicization" critique is a part, is the tension between two
ideals of democratic self-government--collective self-rule through
majoritarian political processes, and the rule of law (or, in the case of public
law, constitutionalism). 12 The separation of law and politics is at the heart
of the liberal ideal of the rule of law, which emphasizes the constraint on
the arbitrary exercise of power by restricting the state to acting through
relatively stable, determinate rules capable of being ascertained in advance
by citizens. 13 The irony, and source of an endlessly fascinating

matter, have some goals in mind while staffing the legal positions in their administrations...
.1').

8. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1194-95 (2006) ("[P]olitics has an entirely appropriate role in the
executive branch. By politics, I mean discretionary considerations of policy and even
ideology, as opposed to the mandatory.. . constraints of legal rules.").
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
10. Id. art. VI.
11. I am talking about federal government officials here, and will analyze issues of
federal government lawyers' ethics throughout this essay, but the same analysis applies at
the state level as well.
12. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1500-01, 1509, 1527
(1988).
13. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-76 (1980); LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-91 (2d ed. 1969); F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
76 (1944); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 213 (1979). A few modem critics question this formal
conception of the rule of law and argue that a system of norms must satisfy some substantive
criteria, such as adequately protecting human rights, to be worthy of the label "law." See,
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jurisprudential puzzle, is that this restriction on state power must be given
effect by creating some institution, itself part of the apparatus of the state,
which acquires power by limiting the power of other institutional actors.
The strategy of constitutionalism vests courts with the authority to
invalidate the actions of the political branches on the basis of entrenched
rights, the source of which is held to be some founding decision of "We The
People," embodied in an act of collective self-constitution. It is to be
expected, however, that interpretive questions might arise concerning the
scope and limits of the entrenched rights against majoritarian actions, that
the officials empowered to enforce the terms of the constitution will be
making decisions that have a profound impact on the lives of citizens, and
that those affected citizens will wonder why they should not have a say in
defining the terms of the rights enforced against the institutions that more
directly reflect their will. 14 While the problem of the legitimacy of the
power of unelected judges has been endlessly discussed under the rubric of
the countermajoritarian difficulty, and there is a burgeoning literature on
executive branch constitutional interpretation, 15 considerably less attention
has been paid to how the same jurisprudential puzzle arises when thinking
about the ethics of lawyers acting as advisors to government officials. 16
e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, PoliticalJudges and the Rule of Law, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9
(1985); Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67 (2007).
14. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999);
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND
DISAGREEMENT (1999).
15. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative
Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi &
Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Dawn E. Johnsen, FunctionalDepartmentalismand Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 2004, at 105; Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of
Constitutional Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 201 (1993);
Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103
MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The
Framers and the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 (1993).
By
comparison, less scholarly attention has been devoted to the issue of legislative
constitutional interpretation. For an important recent contribution to this area, see the essays
collected in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH:
THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006).
16. The relevant lawyers under consideration here are acting in an advisory capacityrendering legal opinions on the permissibility of government action, or even helping to
design and execute government policy. Lawyers acting as counselors are, in effect,
lawgivers with respect to an action, except in the event the action is made the subject of a
litigated dispute. By contrast, government lawyers in litigation contexts have more latitude
to urge creative or aggressive interpretations of law. The obligation of lawyers representing
clients (including public agencies) in litigated matters is still fundamentally to exercise
fidelity to law, but the law in that case includes procedural entitlements and rules of evidence
that enable lawyers to place more reliance on adversarial procedures, rather than their own
beliefs about what the law permits. Litigation advocacy can be seen as an indirect strategy
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The aim of this essay is to hold on to the distinction between faithful
interpretation of, and advising on, the law, and improper politicization of
the role of government lawyers, while acknowledging that considerations of
democratic legitimacy require that the President have considerable
discretion to establish a substantive, ideologically nonneutral policy agenda.
There is a middle ground here, in which government lawyers may be called
upon to resist the impermissible influence of politics and ideology, but not
because there is an ideologically neutral standpoint from which policies and
actions can be evaluated. Rather, as lawyers, these government officials
can differentiate between permissible and impermissible exercises of state
power with respect to the content of the law. There is no claim here that the
content of law is ideologically neutral.1 7 Instead of seeking a conception of
legal legitimacy in which neutrality is central, we can rely on a thinner
conception, in which a necessary condition of legal legitimacy is the
procedures by which legal norms are enacted and interpreted. This is still a
liberal account, in that some considerations are excluded as an acceptable
justification for government decision making. But the exclusion does not
work on standard law-politics lines. 18 Some considerations may be
"political" in the sense that they form part of a larger ideological project,
but are nevertheless considerations that may properly count in favor of a
legal judgment.
Accordingly, the foundation of a theory of government lawyers' ethics
should be the obligation of fidelity to law enacted by tolerably fair
procedures, which supersedes the values (characterized as political,
ideological, or whatever) that would ordinarily constitute the ethics of some
public role. 19 A system of political institutions enables people who would
otherwise disagree intractably, and perhaps violently, to live together
peacefully, cooperate on common projects, and enjoy at least some
moderate amount of social solidarity. Legal norms are legitimate, which is
to say entitled to respect by citizens, because compliance with the demands
of reason in communities requires some kind of coordinating device to take
account of the competing claims asserted by people who may not be able to
20
resolve their disagreements using reason and persuasion alone.
for ensuring fidelity to law, while advising and transactional representation requires a more
direct strategy.
17. For claims that the law must be ideologically neutral in order to be legitimate, see,
for example, ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 66-67 (1976)
(criticizing liberalism for being unable to solve the problem of arbitrariness, in the sense that
any legal restriction placed on the ability of one person to satisfy her desires will necessarily
benefit some individuals more than others).
18. Cf Owen Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986) (distinguishing
politics, which is about "mere" preferences, from adjudication, which is aimed at applying,
or even creating, public values).
19. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 42, 48, 58-61 (1986).
20. See FINNiS, supra note 13, at 136, 317-18 ("[T]he complexity of human
community.., is often lost sight of by those who attempt to explain one order of reality
using exclusively techniques of analysis suitable for another order. . . . [T]he formulae
expressive of legal obligation . . . fit into and give a special conclusory force to the practical
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Admittedly, this is a thin conception of the legitimacy of law, particularly
as compared with republican, deliberative, or dialogic notions of lawcreation through participation or the contestation of legal meanings. 2 1 As
we will see, however, I think there are good reasons to favor thinning out
the grounds on which agreement is necessary in order to secure legitimacy.
If this approach is borne out, it has significant implications for the way we
understand the ethical obligations of lawyers acting in any context, but
particularly as legal advisors to government officials.
I. THE INADEQUACY OF THE STANDARD APPROACHES

A. Interpretive Controversies in the Executive Branch
To illustrate and help draw contrasts among the competing theoretical
foundations of a conception of government lawyers' ethics, it will be
helpful to refer, as an extended case study, to one of the controversies
arising from the Bush administration's claims of virtually unlimited
executive power. To summarize a complicated story, lawyers in the Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) had initially approved a
program whereby the National Security Agency (the government service
responsible for electronic surveillance, spying, and wiretapping) would be
permitted to record telephone conversations without first obtaining a search
warrant or court order. 22 The administration sought this permission despite
the existence of a streamlined process for obtaining permission to conduct
electronic surveillance for national security purposes, established by a
23
statute called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Administration lawyers considered two legal arguments to justify the
President's authority to approve wiretaps without going through the FISA
procedures. First, they argued that the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF), passed by Congress soon after the September 11, 2001
reasonings of those who see and are generally willing to act upon the need (for the common
good) for authority.").
21. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); AMY
GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); Frank I.

Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986).

22. For the background on the warrantless wiretapping program, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, and the executive-power controversy, see Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, 'A
Different Understanding with the President,' WASH. POST, June 24, 2007, at Al; Barton
Gellman & Jo Becker, Pushing the Envelope on PresidentialPower, WASH. POST, June 25,

2007, at A 1;Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Judges on Surveillance Court to Be Briefed
on Spy Program, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2005, at Al; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush
Lets US. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; Michael J.
Sniffen, Ex-Surveillance Judge Criticizes Warrantless Taps, WASH. POST, June 24, 2007, at
A7; Suzanne E. Spaulding, Power Play: Did Bush Roll Past the Legal Stop Signs?, WASH.
POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at BI. A great deal of this reporting is recounted in ERIC LICHTBLAU,
BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008).
23. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801

(2000)).
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attacks, in effect superseded FISA for any intelligence-gathering activities
that could help prevent a terrorist attack. 24 Second, some lawyers within
the administration advanced a position that, as a matter of constitutional
law, the President has the inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces to authorize the collection of signals intelligence on enemy
forces, notwithstanding limitations imposed by FISA. The internal debate
over the legality of the program came to light in a dramatic fashion several
years later, when former Deputy Attorney General James Comey testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee about the refusal of then Attorney
General John Ashcroft to certify the legality of the program when it came
up for reauthorization in March of 2004.25 Ashcroft had acted on the
advice of Jack Goldsmith, who had reviewed the program when he became
the new head of the OLC. 26 Then White House Counsel (later Attorney
General) Alberto Gonzales attempted to secure Ashcroft's approval of the
program while Ashcroft was recovering from surgery in a Washington
hospital. 27
24. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. V 2005)). The AUMF provides,
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.
Id. The Justice Department's arguments were summarized in a letter to the ranking majority
and minority members of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees following
disclosure of the warrantless wiretapping program by the New York Times. The Justice
Department also made available a longer "White Paper" containing more detailed versions of
the arguments. Both letters provoked responses from a group of legal scholars and former
government lawyers who had served in both Democratic and Republican administrations.
The principal criticism of the Justice Department's position can be found in a letter signed
by numerous legal scholars and former government officials published in the New York
Review of Books. See Curtis Bradley et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress, N.Y. REv.
BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at 42, availableat http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18650. All of the
relevant letters were published in an issue of the Indiana Law Journal, with an introduction
by David Cole and Marty Lederman. See David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National
Security Agency's Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355
(2006). The commentary of several legal scholars, including Marty Lederman, Jack Balkin,
and Stephen Griffin, on the Balkinization blog were invaluable in summarizing the many
complex legal issues involved. See Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization,
http://balkin.blogspot. com/2006/12/anti-torture-memos.html#ParttV (Dec. 22, 2006, 14:31
EST).
25. The debate had been reported previously, see, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen,
Justice Deputy Resisted Parts of Spy Program,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at Al, but the story
did not really take off until almost eighteen months later, when James Comey testified about
the dramatic attempt at an "end run" around John Ashcroft. See Hearingon the U.S. Attorney
Firings Before the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 23 (2007) (statement of James B.
Comey, Attorney Gen. of the United States).
26. Jack Goldsmith has stated that he is not permitted to discuss the legal basis for the
administration's so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 182 (2007).

27. Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST, May
16, 2007, at Al.
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In fairness to the OLC lawyers who initially authorized the surveillance,
who come off looking like a bunch of partisan hacks in some versions of
this story, these lawyers sincerely believed their view of the law to be
sound, even if it had not been generally accepted by courts. They certainly
had a coherent, forcefully argued theory of executive power, and were not
troubled by taking a position outside the "mainstream," because they
believed they were at the forefront of legal developments in this area. 28 In
their view, the September 11 th attacks should be regarded as a paradigmshifting event, which courts will eventually recognize as having
fundamentally altered the normative landscape. In the meantime, it is the
job of lawyers to push for legal change, either in litigation or by taking
creative positions when counseling clients. To my contention that it cannot
be the case that the professional responsibility of lawyers is merely to
provide a veneer of legality, these lawyers would respond that their advice
is not a sham, but is respectful of the law, as long as "the law" is not
interpreted in such a static way that it can never respond to pressure for
change. Moreover, one must resist the temptation to criticize their approach
with reference to subsequent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that
rejected many of the most sweeping claims made by the Vice President and
his allies.2 9 The plausibility of a legal judgment cannot be judged only in
hindsight, but must be evaluated to the extent possible from the ex ante
point of view. The law can change unexpectedly, and old verities suddenly
swept away. Reasonable professional judgment is not the same thing as
clairvoyance. 30 The relevant evaluative standpoint for the plausibility of a
judgment is the state of the law at the time the lawyer provided the advice,
with allowances made for what a member of the professional community
would regard as a reasonable argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.
Because there is some superficial plausibility to the OLC lawyers'
position, it would appear difficult to base an ethical critique of these
lawyers on their failure to exhibit fidelity to the law. In particular, these
lawyers might respond that there are multiple potentially correct
interpretations of the governing law, and all they have done is rely on the
interpretation that is the most congenial to their client's ends. What can be
28. For scholarly support of the strong executive power thesis in foreign affairs, see, for
example, Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 15; Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey,
The Executive Power over ForeignAffairs, Ill YALE L.J. 231 (2001); John C. Yoo, Treaties
and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999); John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretationand the False Sirens of
Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002); John C. Yoo, War and the ConstitutionalText, 69

U. CHI. L. REV. 1639 (2002).
29. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
30. In fact, allies of Vice President Dick Cheney have raised exactly this argument,
claiming that the U.S. Supreme Court "'decided to change the rules,"' as opposed to
emphatically restating the existing law that the administration had been ignoring. Barton
Gellman & Jo Becker, The Unseen Path to Cruelty, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at Al
(quoting former Deputy White House Counsel Timothy Flanigan).
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wrong with this? As I discuss in Part III, we need not withhold criticism,
on the grounds of disrespect for the law, just because there is a superficially
plausible interpretation, as judged by the standards of an apparently
legitimate interpretive community. It is possible to deny the legitimacy of
the interpretive norms of certain communities where those norms fail to
track the conceptual requirements of legality. However, recognizing the
challenge of making this position stick, I first review some alternative
grounds for criticizing or approving of the conduct of these lawyers. These
positions, the subjects of Parts II.B and C, respectively, are that (1) the
principal ethical obligation of any lawyer, for a public or private client, is to
pursue the client's lawful interests, with the "lawful" qualification not
imposing much in the way of limitation, because of the indeterminacy of
the law; and (2) the ethical obligation of government lawyers is to act in the
public interest, and in particular to facilitate a process of dialogic
engagement between the state and citizens, over the content of the public
interest.
B. Public Choice
The position I am defending here requires lawyers to exhibit fidelity to
the law when advising their clients. Lawyers can thus be criticized for
politicizing the advice they give to clients if the advice deviates from what
the law, impartially interpreted, would permit or require. One who is
inclined to reject this conception of ethical government lawyering might fall
back on the analytical tools of public choice theory, particularly the
emphasis on the interests of various players-government officials,
pressure groups and lobbyists, the other branches of government, and
lawyers themselves. On the public choice account, the President competes
with the other branches of government, and other actors within the
3
executive branch, over the scarce good of determining government policy. '
A lawyer, as the faithful agent of her client, seeks to advance her client's
interests through any lawful means.
From this perspective, the
politicization critique is literally vacuous, because political actors should
not be understood as pursuing the public's interests or exhibiting fidelity to
the law. 32 Rather, executive branch officials, career bureaucrats, agency
31. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for

PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated
Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80
GEO. L.J. 671 (1992); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the PoliticalControl ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REV.
431 (1989).
32. See John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A
Normative, Descriptive,and HistoricalProlegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 381 (1993)

(defining, among three models of executive branch lawyering, a "situational model," in
which "the President simply interprets the law to advance his political objectives, taking into
account precedent or legal principles only to the extent that they may create a political
obstacle to fulfilling those objectives").
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lawyers, and citizens should be understood as competing to maximize their
share of the scarce good of government policy. Although lawyers may have
their own interests, they are required, by contract and agency law, to serve
as fiduciaries of their clients. If the client has an agenda, it is the lawyer's
job to advance it, as long as the client's preferred course of action does not
contravene applicable law. (Or, in a more extreme version, as long as the
client is unlikely to be caught and punished for engaging in a course of
action.) In the context of government lawyering, the "client" is generally
understood to be an executive branch agency, which may have its own
agenda and policy differences vis-A-vis other government actors. 33 The
lawyer's duties therefore must be understood with reference to these
interests-a government lawyer, like any lawyer, may offer advice, but
beyond34that should not interfere with the client's liberty to take any lawful
action.
Sophisticated public choice theory can illuminate inter- and intrabranch
conflicts, as well as suggest ways that perverse incentives may affect
decision making by government officials and their advisors. 35 It cannot,
however, do any normative work in a theory of government lawyers' ethics
if one believes there really is a distinction between impartial interpretation
and execution of the law as it exists, and simply getting away with
something. 36 In other words, the public choice alternative is that it cannot
account for the distinction between de facto power and legitimate authority.
"Do X' may be the preference of a government official, but "It is legal to do
X' cannot be restated in public choice terms in a way that captures the
reason-giving force of law. It is central to the concept of legality that it
changes the normative situation of citizens and government officials.
Anyone who claims to care about having her actions described as lawful, as
opposed to "something I got away with," is thereby committed to viewing
the law as creating reasons for actions as such. The linchpin of this
expressivist argument is therefore the purpose for which a citizen or a
government official engages the law. She may be interested only in
describing and predicting certain patterns of behavior among fellow
citizens, in which case it is perfectly appropriate to take an external
perspective on the law. If she is interested in acting lawfully, however, her
practical reasoning necessarily proceeds from a perspective in which the
law imposes genuine obligations-what H. L. A. Hart called the internal
33. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional
Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1994).
34. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 437, 449 (1993).
35. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997).
36. Strictly speaking, public choice is a positive theory, an attempt at an explanation of

behavior, not a normative theory, which is an attempt at a justification. In practice, however,
the positive and normative uses of public choice theory are often run together by legal
scholars, generally relying on broadly consequentialist axiological assumptions. See, e.g.,
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Eric A.
Posner, InternationalLaw: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (2006).
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point of view. 37 The internal point of view is mandated by the conjunction
of action, as opposed to observation (for which an external perspective
would be adequate), and the evaluation that an action is lawful, as opposed
to merely something that one can get away with. If this relationship holds,
then acting under law while regarding the law from an external point of
view would be on a par, normatively speaking, with robbing a bank and
successfully asserting an alibi defense, or bribing a prosecutor to drop
charges. The actor would have managed to avoid sanctions, but the
evaluation of the action would be that it was wrong from the standpoint of a
relevant normative framework, that of legality.
The appeal to the discourse of legality is natural when one wishes to
assert not only that one wants something, or has the power to obtain it, but
that it is right that one have it. For something to be a legal right, it must be
an aspect of a legal system, which is necessarily connected with the
interests and values of a society, not the individual. Legality is the
normative domain in which citizens seek to "transform[] brute demands
into assertions of right[s]. '' 38 This transformation necessarily commits one
to a certain pattern of explanation and justification. This is the case for
participants in any practice, whether players in a game, initiates of a
religious vocation, political officials, or, in this case, citizens who seek the
ascription of lawfulness for their actions. 39 Participating in social practices
entails accepting the authority of internal, practice-dependent regulative
standards as guides to behavior, and accepting the legitimacy of criticism
based on those standards. These regulative standards are not arbitrary, but
have their origin in some ultimate state of affairs or value that is the aim of
the social practice of which they are a part.40 The regulative standards of
the practice have authority for a participant because of the participant's
voluntary act of "opting in" to the practice. 4 1 It would be a conceptual error
for participants to regard the norms of a practice from an external point of
view, because to participate in a practice means to aim at the end for which
the practice is constituted, and doing this requires conformity to the internal
regulative standards of the practice. Thus, the "bad man" perspective on

37. For further argument on this point, see W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens, and
the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2006).

38. I owe this useful phraseology to Daniel Markovits. See Daniel Markovits, Adversary
Advocacy and the Authority ofAdjudication, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1385 (2006).
39. I use the term "practice" here in the sense, developed by Alasdair Maclntyre, of "any
coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through
which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form

of activity."

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY OF MORAL THEORY 187 (2d

ed. 1984).
40. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). In the postscript to
the second edition of The Concept of Law, H. L. A. Hart explains the internal/external
distinction with reference to the practice conception of rules. See H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 254-55 (2d ed. 1994).
41. MACINTYRE, supra note 39, at 190.
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any practice is ruled out by the act of avowing that one is a participant
42
rather than an observer.
Applying all of this to public choice theory, it should be apparent that it
is insufficient, from a normative point of view, to assert that the duty of a
government lawyer is to maximize the likelihood that her "clients"-a
particular agency, for example-will prevail in some struggle for control
over the policy-making agenda. Descriptively, it may be the case that
"Congress, the federal courts, and other agencies can and should protect
their own interests. '4 3 This does not mean, however, that ascertaining the
interests of one's political superiors exhausts the practical reasoning of
government lawyers, if lawyers are concerned to attribute a special legal
significance to their advice. It may be that lawyers care only about keeping
their political superiors out of trouble, in which case the expressivist
argument set out here would not have much bite. It may be the case that
political superiors are looking only for political cover in the form of an
opinion from a lawyer authorizing the conduct; this may be different in
important ways from a lawyer's advice that the conduct is lawful. 44 To the
extent a lawyer's legal advice is intended in good faith, however, it is
simply incoherent to render it without regard to the actual content of the
law, as opposed to the likelihood of punishment, the interests of the various
parties, and other considerations that may be weighed as costs and benefits.
With respect to the politicization critique, it would be a mistake to rely
on public choice theory to argue that there is really no such thing as
politicized legal advice. An oversimplified public choice approach to
government lawyers' ethics might be to instruct lawyers simply to pursue
the interests of their agency clients-to be "zealous advocates" of these
positions when there is some conflict with other branches of government or
political opponents outside of government. This conception of the duty of
government lawyers will not do because it omits the concept of lawfulness
entirely. As lawyers (in both private and government practice) sometimes
forget, the little mantra describing their duties is actually "zealous
representation within the bounds of the law."'45 That means that the
interests of clients-political or otherwise-are not the only consideration
42. See Rawls, supra note 40, at 25-26.
43. Macey & Miller, supra note 33, at 1116.
44. For example, David Luban has argued that, with respect to legal advising on the
treatment of detainees and permissible interrogation techniques, the Bush administration
desired, and Justice Department lawyers provided, only the pretense of legal advice, in order
to provide political cover for doing something that the administration was committed to
doing anyway. DAVID LUBAN, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND

HUMAN DIGNITY 162, 163-65 (2007).
45. The Restatement provides that the lawyer's basic duty is to "proceed in a manner
reasonably calculated to advance a client's lawful objectives, as defined by the client after
consultation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (2000).

The term "zealous advocacy" derives from the ethical considerations in the ABA's Model
Code, promulgated in 1969. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1969)
("A [l]awyer [s]hould [r]epresent [a] [c]lient [z]ealously [w]ithin [t]he [b]ounds [o]f [t]he
[1]aw.").
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to be taken into account. Instead, the lawyer's job is to pursue the interests
of the client, but only to the extent it is legally permissible to do so. I do
not believe legal permissibility is a matter of making simple, binary
judgments that the law either does or does not permit something. The law
does not work like that, and there may be a range of reasonable, good faith
disagreement over what is legally permitted. The underdetermination of
legal judgments by existing legal materials (texts, immanent principles,
interpretive methodologies, and so on) creates the possibility that a lawyer's
advice may be deemed more or less well supported. There is usually a
confidence dimension attached to legal advice, so that lawyers' judgments
come in the form of a two-place variable. Lawyers are accustomed to
thinking in this way, even if they do not always communicate their doubts
to clients, so that the conclusion of legal research and analysis might be,
"I'm pretty sure you can do that," or "You can give it a shot, but I expect it
won't work." More formally, an interpretive judgment would consist of N
= (x, y) where N is the conduct the client wishes to engage in, x is the
lawyer's judgment about a substantive entitlement, and y is the confidence
dimension.
The politicization critique can therefore be restated in terms of (1) how
much confidence a lawyer must have in an interpretive judgment before
advising a client that it can do what it wants to do, and (2) how much
"creativity" we are willing to tolerate in legal interpretation before we
conclude that a lawyer is not interpreting the law in good faith, but is
instead providing "plausible deniability" or a veneer of legality to cover a
lawless act by the client. In the context of government lawyering,
particularly the opinion function of the Attorney General and the OLC,
there is a well-known debate over whether lawyers should be "neutral
expositors" of the law, offering the best view of what the law actually is,
reasoning from a quasi-judicial point of view-or whether lawyers are
permitted to push the envelope and rely on interpretations that are
defensible but farther from the core of the best available interpretation of
the law. 46 To put it another way, must executive branch lawyers faithfully
follow existing court decisions, or is their independent opinion function less
constrained than a judge's discretion in a comparable case? No one really
questions the principle that executive branch officials must independently
make judgments about the legal permissibility of some course of action; the
separation of powers doctrine vests each branch with a substantial measure
of autonomy, including the responsibility to evaluate the legal basis for
their activities. The question, instead, is whether an executive branch
46. See John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in

Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 371 (1988); McGinnis, supra note 32;
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanationsfor Judgments,
15 CARDOZO L. REv. 43 (1993); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation:
A Perspectivefrom the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REv. 1303 (2000); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most DangerousBranch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83
GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).
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official may act on the basis of a judgment that diverges from what the
judiciary would decide, if it considered the case.
At this point in the argument, critics of the neutral expositor model
engage in a subtle sleight of hand. John McGinnis's formulation is typical:
The strongest argument for executive independence with respect to the
analytical judgments of the Court rests on the notion that even these
judgments need to be subject to challenge by another institution with a
different perspective. The distinctive institutional perspective of the
executive branch,4 7 however, rests precisely on the fact that it is closer to
the popular will.

The italicized word, "different," slyly suggests that the executive and
judicial branches may simply have a disagreement about the right way to
interpret the law, and that is all that can be said about the matter-you say
tom-ay-to, I say tom-ah-to. If the disagreement were just a matter of taste
or preference, then McGinnis would be correct to favor the interpretation of
the branch with a closer connection to the will of the people. But notice
how we are supposed to take for granted that all disagreements over legal
interpretations come down to questions of taste.
McGinnis's argument implicitly denies that lawyers in the executive
branch and judges can reach intersubjective agreement on the correctness of
legal judgments, so that disagreements over interpretation are simply a
matter of preference, as opposed to one of the interpreters having gotten it
wrong. If McGinnis is correct about this, then there really is nothing left of
the politicization critique. While this may be too strong, the public choice
critique can be restated in a moderate form in cases in which reasonable
minds can differ over the correct interpretation-not because there is no
such thing as objectivity, but because genuine (i.e., objective) uncertainty
exists over the best way to interpret existing law. Lawyers commonly give
advice of the form, "I'm pretty sure you can do that, but there's a risk that a
court won't go along," or, "While I think it's a bit of a stretch to argue that
the AUMF supersedes the warrant requirement in FISA, it's not a ridiculous
argument, so if you're willing to accept the risk of losing in court, you can
go for it." No one disputes that if a court has rendered a binding judgment,
executive branch officials are duty-bound to respect it.
There is
nevertheless uncertainty over the binding effect of legal principles that have
been invoked in support of past judicial decisions. 4 8 In essence, the neutral
expositor view instructs executive branch lawyers to consider those
principles and other underlying reasons, and render the same decision as an
ideal judge, who is concerned to come up with the best interpretation of the
49
law-to show the law in its best light, as Ronald Dworkin puts it.
Superficially, at least, this seems odd. Lawyers and judges occupy discrete
roles in the legal system, and should be expected to have different
47. McGinnis, supra note 32, at 381-82 (emphasis added).
48. See generally Merrill, supra note 46.
49. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225, 256 (1986).
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responsibilities. The adversary system-to say nothing of the separation of
powers doctrine-enacts a normative division of labor among various
institutional actors, responding to political needs such as limiting
government power and enhancing accountability. Lawyers for private
clients, at least in litigation, need not assert only legal positions they believe
to be the best view of the law, or even reasonably well founded. As long as
a legal argument is not lacking in any foundation whatsoever, it is
permissible to urge it to a court.
I have never understood why this argument from the adversary system is
thought to prove anything about legal advising outside the litigation
context. The argument proceeds by taking the lawyer's litigation-advocacy
role as the baseline, and then demanding a justification for any deviation
from that baseline. Regarding executive branch lawyers, the arguments that
have been offered, from history, the text of the Constitution (particularly the
Take Care Clause and the presidential oath of office), and constitutional
structure, are inconclusive. 50 Thus, goes the appeal to the adversary
system, we do not have a sufficient reason to deviate from the baseline
conception of the lawyer's role. But why should we take the lawyer's
litigation-related duties and permissions as the baseline, and not as a special
case? In my view, the obligations of lawyers, as agents of clients, have to
be understood with reference to the client's legal entitlements. In any
principal-agent relationship, including the attorney-client relationship, the
agent's rights and obligations are derivative of those of the principal.
Someone who retains a broker to sell property empowers the broker to
transfer only whatever title the owner has.
Similarly, a lawyer's
professional role is defined with reference to the rights and duties vested in
the client by the law. This principle pervades the law governing lawyers,
including specific rules of tort, agency, and constitutional law as they apply
to lawyers. For example, as the agent of the client, the lawyer retains
inherent authority, which cannot be overridden by agreement with the
client, to refuse to perform unlawful acts. 51
Regarding the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of the effective assistance of counsel to criminal
defendants, the Supreme Court held in Nix v. Whiteside that a criminal
defendant cannot complain if his lawyer refuses to permit him to perjure
himself at trial because a lawyer's duty is "limited to legitimate, lawful
'52
conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial as a search for truth."
As Justice Harry Blackmun noted in his concurring opinion, the client had
no legitimate interest that conflicted with his lawyer's obligation not to
53
present perjured testimony.
50. See CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND

THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 48-80 (considering historical examples of more or less

political Attorneys General). Compare Moss, supra note 46, at 1312-14, with Merrill, supra
note 46, at 53-54 (assessing the Take Care Clause as the source of the duty to serve as a
neutral expositor).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 23(1) (2000).

52. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986).
53. Id. at 187.
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Litigation is a special case because lawyers are permitted to assert the
arguable legal entitlements of clients, leaving it up to the workings of the
adversary system to evaluate whether the lawyer's position is plausible.
Even in the litigation context, however, the rights and permissions of
lawyers are ultimately grounded in their clients' legal entitlements.
Lawyers may not assert constructions of law that are not adequately
grounded either in existing law or in a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 54 Lawyers have an
obligation to disclose controlling legal authority not cited by their
adversary, an obligation that does not extend to factual evidence not
discovered by opposing counsel. 55
Advocates have been severely
sanctioned for stretching legal arguments too far and not candidly
informing the court of the limitations of their position. 56 Even in litigation,
fidelity to law is one of the fundamental obligations of the lawyer, along
with loyalty to the client. The difference between the litigation and
counseling contexts is that, in litigation, lawyers share responsibility with
other institutional actors for ensuring that the law is not distorted or
misapplied. In the counseling context there is no institutional mechanism,
comparable to adversary briefing, oral argument, and appeal, to ensure that
the lawyer's proposed interpretation of law is the correct one. Thus,
lawyers have what feels like a heightened obligation of fidelity to law, but
in reality the obligation is the same-it is just not shared with coordinate
institutional actors.
To turn the burden-of-proof argument around, one who contends that a
government lawyer need provide only a colorable legal basis for a proposed
course of action has the burden to explain why a lawyer, seeking to
ascertain whether a client has a legal entitlement to do something, should be
content to get the answer only approximately right, or should aim for the
best answer.
Consider a comparable professional principal-agent
relationship, such as a patient seeking medical advice. Suppose the doctor
could provide a colorable diagnosis or the best diagnosis, with roughly the
same investment of time and effort. It is hard to imagine a patient who
would be content with anything less than the best diagnosis the doctor was
able to provide. In the legal counseling context, the reason clients seek
merely colorable advice is that they are interested in getting away with
something that is not a genuine legal right. In the FISA example, if it
would be a real stretch to believe that the AUMF supersedes the FISA
warrant requirement, and the better view of the governing law is that it does
not, the lawyer would be offering two alternatives-what the client's right
probably is, and what the client's right likely is not. Granting that the
administration's interest in this case is to avoid the warrant requirement, I
do not see how that interest changes the normative situation of the lawyer,
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2007).
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2).
56. See, e.g., Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
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whose role is defined by the obligation to ascertain and apply the client's
legal entitlements. Deliberately relying on the less plausible interpretation
of the applicable law is nothing but an evasion of the basic responsibility of
a lawyer. Again, if a matter is in litigation, we permit lawyers to urge less
plausible interpretations of law, because we think the adversary system
needs some input of interpretive creativity if it is to remain sufficiently
flexible to adapt to changing circumstances. In the counseling context,
however, a lawyer's job is to find the limits of the client's legal
entitlements, because the client is only permitted to act with legal
57
authorization.
In summary, the shortcoming of the public choice approach to lawyers'
ethics is that it denies that lawyers can have any genuine obligation of
fidelity to law. The public choice theorist asserts that we may talk in
normative terms, using the language of duties and "oughts," but all of these
would-be obligations are really just roundabout ways of saying that there
would be negative political repercussions to appearing to act lawlessly. If it
is possible to act lawlessly and get away with it, lawyers have no duty to
advise their client against that course of action and, indeed, if it is in the
client's interests, the lawyer may have a duty to assist the client. On the
level of ordinary-language analysis, one might ask the public choice theorist
why she bothers using words like "lawful" and "right" when what she really
means is "what my client can get away with." A more natural interpretation
of that language is that lawyers and government officials really do mean to
avow, when they use the language of obligation and right, that they are
acting with reference to some normative considerations that are independent
of their interests.
C. Civic Republicanism and the Public Interest
A very different fallback position, which would allow one to criticize
government lawyers for politicized decision making, is to appeal to a notion
of the public interest. This position is a staple of the self-justifying rhetoric
of government lawyers-present or former Attorneys General, or nominees
for the office. As President Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell, stated
in a lecture at Fordham University School of Law, "Although our client is
the government, in the end we serve a more important constituency: the
American people."'58 Courts similarly state that government lawyers have
an obligation to see to it that justice is done, not simply to maximize the
likelihood that the client's interests will be achieved. 59 However, this is not
just empty rhetoric for graduation speeches. It has been offered in this form
57. See Moss, supra note 46, at 1315-16.
58. Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer
and ChiefLitigator,or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1069 (1978).
59. See, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (chiding attorneys for the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission for not taking an opportunity to settle ongoing litigation and noting that
"government lawyers have obligations beyond those of private lawyers").
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as a sophisticated alternative to the view, dominant among practicing
lawyers, that the lawyer's role is primarily to be understood with reference
to client interests, with the law understood as nothing more than an obstacle
standing in the way of their clients' ends. 6 0 In addition, there is a long
tradition in political philosophy, associated with the ideal of the rule of law,
of understanding the principal obligation of government officials as acting
61
in the public interest.
Significantly, the public interest is not understood in rational-choice
terms, as the aggregation of preferences through some procedure of
majoritarian decision making. In civic republican theory, the public interest
is expressly contrasted with the will of (perhaps transient) political
majorities. Frank Michelman, for example, criticizes the Supreme Court's
Bowers v. Hardwick decision for its assumption that "public values meriting
enforcement as law are to be uncritically equated with ... the formally
62
enacted preferences of a recent legislative or past constitutional majority."
Because it is now accepted wisdom that executive branch officials-not just
the courts-have a role in enforcing the law, the implication of
Michelman's critique is that government lawyers-as well as judgesshould not concern themselves only with "the formally enacted preferences
of a recent legislative ... majority." 63 As law constantly re-creates itself in
line with the public reasons of citizens, its precise contours remain
uncertain, subject to contestation in the dialectic process of politics. In
other words, Michelman would instruct government lawyers not to be legal
positivists and not to enforce only those public values that have an
appropriate democratic pedigree.
The natural response to this antipositivist move is to point out that
government decisions are supposed to be traceable back to some
manifestation of the popular will. When lawyers act on what they take to
be the public interest, they usurp power that should belong to the people as
a whole. 64 We would not bother having elections if it were clear what the
public interest requires, not only for the epistemological reason that

60. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1
(1988); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003); Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of
Professionalism:
IDEALS/LAWYERS'

The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS'
PRACTICES:

TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION

177, 180 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the
Republican Originsof the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 242 (1992); William
H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the ProfessionalIdeal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565
(1985).
61. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 272-73 (1980) (arguing

that one aspect of the rule of law is fundamentally about "holding... the rulers to their side
of a relationship of reciprocity, in which the claims of authority are respected on condition
that authority respects the claims of the common good").
62. Michelman, supra note 12, at 1496.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks
and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
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elections provide information on the preferences of citizens, but also for the
deeply moral reason that de facto power is insufficient to justify the claim
by the state to possess authority. 65 Michelman, however, calls this answer
"both lazy and presumptuous. ' 66 Political freedom means both collective
self-rule and government by laws. 6 7 These two conceptions of freedom can
be best reconciled by understanding the legitimacy of the product of a
political process in terms of shared, collective participation, not merely the
aggregation of antecedent preferences. In Robert Cover's term, politics
must be jurisgenerative-i.e.,capable of transforming private persons into
public-regarding citizens. 68 The political process must be structured in such
a way that it does not simply feed in exogenous preferences as inputs, and
produce laws as outputs, according to some aggregation process. Instead,
the political process must permit citizens to persuade each other, to alter
their pre-existing preferences, and to work together as a community, in the
name of the interests of the society as a whole. Citizens must act
nonstrategically, be open to persuasion, and be committed to acting from a
kind of idealized first-person-plural point of view, as opposed to trying to
maximize the satisfaction of their preferences.
I tend to regard this whole line of thought as far-fetched, not because it is
not appealing to imagine the kind of community it presupposes, but because
it is ill suited to serve as a regulatory ideal for a large-scale, decentralized,
complex, pluralistic society. There are at least three reasons for this. The
first pertains to the motivation to participate in jurisgenerative politics: a
sizeable number of would-be citizens are in fact concerned only to
maximize the satisfaction of their preferences, and regard politics as a zerosum game. If it is a necessary condition of political legitimacy that people
are open to persuasion, a broad swath of law would have to be regarded as
illegitimate. The second is that most people simply are not committed to
any point of view with regard to the technical details of government policy,
but the function of politics and law is frequently to settle on those pesky
technical details. This is particularly true where there is agreement at a high
level of generality but, as the saying goes, the devil is in the details. Even
assuming a general consensus that, for example, taxation should be
generally (but not too steeply) progressive, there will still be a great deal of
disagreement at the level of application, such as how mortgage interest and
retirement savings should be treated for tax purposes. A related objection is
that the technical details in question may pertain to the procedures used to
handle debate and settle on the position that will be adopted in the name of

65. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, Realism and Moralism in Political Theory, in IN THE
BEGINNING WAS THE DEED 1, 5 (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 2005) (defining the "Basic
Legitimation Demand" as a constitutive element of "there being such a thing as politics").
66. Michelman, supra note 12, at 1498.
67. Id. at 1500-01.
68. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,

97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 11, 15 (1983).
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society. 69 It seems unlikely that deliberation will yield real consensus on
important matters (a point elaborated below), so we need some way to reach
at least provisional agreement-"an uneasy compromise, subject to constant
renegotiation," 70 which is at least final enough to enable coordinated action
for the time being. If deliberative engagement does not produce consensus,
some procedure will have to be adopted to resolve the disagreement, but if
consensus is required on how these procedures are to be structured, then the
result may be an infinite regress of unsettled disagreement. Third, and of
the greatest theoretical interest, politics may inevitably involve
compromises, and have a zero-sum nature, because many of the issues at
stake in politics are not susceptible to rational resolution.
Human experience, and the goods and values associated with it, is
sufficiently complex that it is impossible to reduce all of these goods and
values to some higher-order, master value that can be used to rank and
prioritize competing ethical considerations. 7 1 Competing values may be
formally different, in that some pertain to things we have reason to care
about from an impersonal perspective (i.e., consequences), while others
depend on seeing ourselves as in some way the source of value (agentrelative reasons, such as deontological considerations). 72 These microlevel
value conflicts may represent conflicts within a single conception of the
good life or they may represent conflicts between rival visions of human
flourishing. As Isaiah Berlin argued, there are many different ends people
may pursue, and still be recognized as fully rational, and fully human; there
are multiple objectively valuable things that individuals and cultures may
regard as fulfilling and worthy objects of attainment. 73 The attainment of
one of these ideals often requires the subordination or abandonment of
others. 74 There is no possibility of a life which embodies certain goods or
75
virtues without excluding others.
69. See Don Herzog, Some Questionsfor Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473, 487-88

(1986).
70. Id. at 488.
71. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 112 (1999)

("On any

plausible account, human life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will
disagree about how to balance or prioritize them.").
72. See CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 131-34 (1987);
THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 128-41 (1979) (discussing the fragmentation of

value). David Ross famously listed categories of prima facie moral obligations, arising from
different circumstances of human existence, including duties of loyalty, gratitude,
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and perfectionist duties. See W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE
GOOD 20-21 (1930).
73. See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HUMANITY 10-11 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990).
74. STUART HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT 146 (1983).
75. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:

AN ANTHOLOGY 369, 413 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1997) ("[W]e are faced
with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of
some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others .... [Ilit seems to me that the
belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of
men can be harmoniously realised is demonstrably false. If, as I believe, the ends of men are
many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of
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These goods are incommensurable in that there is no way that one can
rationally judge one way of life to be better than another, or of equal value.
For Berlin the primary significance of this observation was political. One
of the central themes in his work is that human history teaches us to be
extremely wary of any claim to political legitimacy and authority that is
founded upon a claim that the rulers have accurately discerned the "true"
nature of their subjects. 76 "In the ideal case, liberty coincides with law[;]
autonomy with authority," 77 but this is true only if human beings have only
one true purpose, and "the ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit
into a single universal, harmonious pattern. '7 8 Berlin's striking observation
is that the worst tyrannies and the most utopian hopes for human salvation
through government shared the Platonic belief that there is only one
rationally appointed order for human life. 79 It would be a dramatic
overstatement to say that directing government officials and government
lawyers to act directly on their perception of the public interest would lead
to tyranny. However, it may nevertheless be the case that government
decisions based on an official's beliefs-even sincere, good faith beliefsabout morality are lacking in legitimacy.
One might respond that deliberative or jurisgenerative politics can exist
despite moral pluralism and the incommensurability of values. Michelman
himself accepts that, arguing that it is impossible to understand even a fairly
thin conception of democratic legitimacy without positing the "mutual and
reciprocal awareness [of citizens] of being co-participants not just in this
one debate, but in a more encompassing common life." 80 But he seems to
slide a bit too easily from the possibility of participation in a shared
experience-"the possibility of cases in which [legal] validation occurs
when participants, rather than abandoning their commitments, come to hold
the same commitments in a new way"8 '-to a necessary condition of legal
validity. A great many laws would appear to fail this test for validity, since
many do not arise as the result of any public debate at all, and among those
that do, many result from compromises between positions that remain
unaltered. In fairness to Michelman, he is talking about constitutional law,
conflict-and of tragedy-can never be wholly eliminated from human life, either personal

or social.").
76. Id. at 403-04.
77. Id. at 404.
78. Id. at 407.
79. Id. at 405 ("The sage knows you better than you know yourself, for you are the
victim of your passions, a slave living a heteronomous life, purblind, unable to understand
your true goals. You wish to be a human being. It is the aim of the State to justify your
wish.... [H]umanity is the raw material upon which I impose my creative will; even though
men suffer and die in the process, they are lifted by it to a height to which they could never
have risen without my coercive-but creative-violation of their lives. This is the argument
used by every dictator, inquisitor, and bully who seeks some moral, or even aesthetic,
justification for his conduct.").
80. Michelman, supra note 12, at 1513.
81. Id. at 1527 (quoting HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, FORTUNE IS A WOMAN: GENDER AND
POLITICS INTHE THOUGHT OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI 279 (1984)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
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not ordinary laws of less moment, but the tenor of much writing on civic
republicanism tends to valorize participatory politics and the possibility of
the transformation of prelegal preferences through engagement with one's
fellow citizens. 82 What Michelman objects most strongly to is legal
positivism, i.e., "the view that judicial power cannot be legitimate unless its
exercise consists, in the final analysis, of the translation of directions
uttered in the past by someone else." 83 To be a positivist is to accept that
the content and validity of any law is fundamentally a matter of social fact,
and the relevant social facts are generally the past utterances of institutional
actors such as legislators and judges. If this is the case, then it is an
empirical matter to discover the content of the law-one simply looks at the
relevant sources to determine what judges have relied upon as reasons for
their decisions. Metaphorically, one can draw a boundary line separating
reasons that are "inside" the law from those that are "outside" the law.
Armed with this information, one can then criticize, as failing to respect the
obligation of impartiality, government lawyers who make reference to
reasons outside the law when justifying a would-be legal interpretation. On
the other hand, if some kind of moral or political argument is required to
differentiate between law and nonlaw, it is not simply an empirical matter
to draw a boundary separating inside from outside. The distinction between
law and nonlaw would be evaluative and contestable, and would make
reference to the very sorts of political, ideological, and policy reasons that
may or may not be part of the law.
The claim that the possibility of a value-free or apolitical distinction
between law and nonlaw is untenable is also at the heart of Ronald
Dworkin's theory of law. Dworkin argues that "judicial decisions in civil
cases ... characteristically are and should be generated by principle not
policy." 84 For Dworkin, the distinction between reasons of principle and
reasons of policy is that principles can be shown to be consistent with past
political decisions made by other officials (judges and legislators) within a
general political theory that justifies those decisions. 85 Policy reasons, in
contrast with principles, may refer to moral norms but these are not norms
that belong to this particular society's political morality. 8 6 Reasons of
principle are therefore "inside" a particular society's law and reasons of
policy are "outside" the law of that community, but note that for Dworkin,
"the law" must be understood in an idiosyncratic way. Hart claims that for
any legal system, there is a master rule for distinguishing law from nonlaw;
this is the rule of recognition. 87 He further insists that the existence and
82. This is a major theme of the work of Daniel Markovits. See Markovits, supra note
38; Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897 (2004); Daniel
Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 209

(2003).
83. Michelman, supra note 12, at 1522.
84. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 84 (1977) (emphasis added).

85. Id. at 87-88.
86. Id. at 22, 90-92.
87. HART, supra note 40, at 100-10.
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content of the law can be determined without reference to moral criteria. 8 8
Dworkin challenges both the existence of a rule of recognition and the
content-independence of law. He denies that a rule of recognition can ever
be formulated because moral argumentation is necessary to establish the
existence of legal principles. 89 Reasons of principle are controversial in the
sense that they cannot simply be "read off' the law in a straightforward way
without arguing that they are justified on the basis of the normative political
theory. 90 There can be no source-based criteria for identifying legal
principles. Reasons given by judges in precedent cases must be understood
as arguments of political theory about what the law should be.9 1 The
practice of making and justifying legal judgments is therefore normative all
the way down.
The question is, therefore, why one should be a positivist and not
subscribe to Michelman's view that legal interpretation is not a matter of
uncovering what has happened in the past, but is a dynamic process of
creating one's normative universe, or Dworkin's view that the law consists
in part of principles, which embody the community's political morality.
For if Michelman and Dworkin are right, there is a strong case that lawyers
in government service are out to contribute to the process ofjurisgenesis by
urging political officials to act on a conception of the public interest, even if
it is presently contested. A theory of lawyers' ethics is therefore connected
to a theory of law by the question of what sorts of considerations "count" as
law, and therefore should be taken into account by lawyers advising their
clients on the legality of a proposed course of action. Michelman and
Dworkin resist the separation of law and politics by arguing for a
conception of law, and a conception of politics, in which law and politics
are two sides of the same coin. In response, some legal positivists may rely
on conceptual arguments, like Joseph Raz's well-known authority
argument. 92 Alternatively, positivists may offer normative (or maybe better
described as functional) arguments, relying on the point of having law in
the first place. 93 Something like the debate about the nature of law cannot
be settled solely by conceptual analysis; progress depends, instead, on
having some idea of why we care about questions like whether there are
legal principles, and how they are different from legal rules and extralegal
88. Id. at 269. Hart stressed the content-independence of law in papers written after the
first edition of The Concept of Law. See H. L. A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal
Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM:

STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 243

(1982).
89. DWORKIN, supra note 84, at 40-41, 43, 90.

90. Id. at 65-68.
91. DWORKIN, supra note 49, at 248 ("[H]e must decide which interpretation shows the
legal record to be the best it can be from the standpoint of substantive political morality."
(emphasis added)).
92. Joseph Raz, Authority, Law andMorality, in ETHICS INTHE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS
IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 210 (1994).

93. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in HART'S
POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAw 411 (Jules Coleman ed.,
2001).
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"policy" considerations. Michelman appeals to history and political theory;
Dworkin to common usage among lawyers and judges. My reliance here on
moral pluralism is intended to underwrite a functional claim that the point
of having law is to enable citizens to coexist and cooperate on mutually
beneficial projects despite persistent disagreement.
94
Law is "an importantly distinct mode or aspect of governance"
precisely because of its independence from contested conceptions of the
public good. It provides a framework for coordinated action in the face of
dissensus, perhaps at the expense (as Michelman suggests, with his
reference to the legitimacy of Brown v. Board of Education) of respect for
95
marginalized groups and the capacity to keep pace with social change.
The claim of the normative positivists is that the values associated with
law, legality, and the rule of law-in a fairly rich sense--can best be
achieved if the ordinary operation of such a system does not require
96
people to exercise moral judgment in order to find out what the law is.
The value of legality within government can best be achieved by
directing government lawyers not to act directly on what they perceive to be
the public good because what the public good requires is contested, in good
faith, in most interesting cases. Government through law means, however,
that we must eventually move beyond this disagreement and do something
about a problem. The law provides a framework for dealing, cooperatively,
with these problems by enacting a provisional settlement of normative
disagreement. It is therefore incumbent upon lawyers, as an aspect of their
obligation of fidelity to law, to respect this settlement and not act directly
on what they believe to be the public interest.
II.

FIDELITY IN INTERPRETATION AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOVERNMENT

LAWYERS' ETHICS

There must be an alternative to, on the one hand, using terms like
"politicization" merely as terms of abuse to signify actions with which one
disagrees, and on the other hand capitulating to the view that there is no
such thing as a faithful, neutral exposition of law. If the law were perfectly
determinate-that is, if there were only one right answer to any given
question of law-we could criticize government lawyers for politicizing
their advice if it deviated from the right answer in a way that favored the
party in power. The basic responsibility of any lawyer-whether in
government or private practice-is to order her client's affairs with respect
to the client's legal entitlements.
This basic responsibility can be
contextualized, so that a lawyer in litigation may urge that the client's
94. Id. at 420.
95. Michelman, supra note 12, at 1524 ("Black Americans... were not tantamount to

'the people,' and there is no telling how long it would have taken for their new foundations
to have risen to the level of constitutional significance for a Court following Ackerman's
argument.").
96. Waldron, supra note 93, at 421.
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entitlements be interpreted in a way that is the most favorable to the client.
In the advising context, the lawyer attempts to ascertain the boundaries of
the client's entitlements, and then counsel the client to comply with the law.
Even if one accepts this vision of legal ethics in theory, however, a natural
objection is that the boundaries of the client's entitlements are unclear; that
is, the law is indeterminate to some extent. The evident fact of the
underdetermination of legal judgments by social sources can sometimes
lend unwarranted credence to arguments attempting to cast doubt on the
capacity of law to establish any provisional settlements of normative
controversy. The strong indeterminacy critique can then be combined with
the public choice notion that client interests are the most important thing in
the lawyer's normative universe, creating an unholy alliance of cynical
perspectives on the law. The idea that the fundamental ethical obligation of
lawyers is to exhibit fidelity to law thus seems laughable.
I have argued that there is actually a great deal of determinacy in the law,
but that lawyers are often looking for it in all the wrong places.
Interpretation is, by its nature, a community-bound practice, and the criteria
for an acceptable interpretation are the property of a professional
interpretive community, not the thing to be interpreted. 97 The difficulty
with this reliance on the notion of an interpretive community is that there
may be factions within the community, which may deem acceptable
incompatible interpretations of the applicable legal materials. However, the
idea of an interpretive community is not a jurisprudential primitive, so that
there is nothing more that one can say about an interpretation, beyond that it
is acceptable to some faction within the community. Instead, one can
always appeal to extracommunity standards related to the concept of law as
a purposive, reason-giving enterprise. More specifically, the conception of
that concept is given by the ideal of the rule of law and the value of legality,
which emphasize considerations such as generality, publicity, and the
capacity of legal norms to check the exercise of power. 98 These rule-of-law
ideals enable us to critique the interpretive claims made by factions within
the community and determine which interpretation is the right one.
The most basic constraint on what counts as a plausible interpretation of
law is that law must be viewed as a purposive activity, as having some point
97. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 18.

Owen Fiss refers to the norms of an interpretive

community as "disciplining rules," see id. at 11, but this imprecise use of the term "rules"

has created unnecessary confusion, as is evident in Fiss's debate with Stanley Fish. See
Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984).

Fish makes an infinite regress

argument, noting that if these interpretive norms were indeed rules, they would stand in need
of interpretation, requiring further meta-disciplining rules. See id. at 1326, 1334. Instead of

rules, Fish believes an interpretive community is constituted by "interpretive assumptions
and procedures [that] are so widely shared in a community that the rule appears to all in the
same (interpreted) shape." Id. at 1327. Fiss's argument, read carefully, is that there are
"interpretive assumptions and procedures" that are widely shared within a community.
Apparently, Fiss actually does not disagree with Fish at all, and Fish has simply seized on
Fiss's use of the word "rule" to argue against a position that Fiss does not hold.

98. See, e.g.,
note 13, at 210.

DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW

194-214 (1984); RAZ, supra
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or end. 99 One might also say that legal argumentation is a craft, which
carries with it internal standards of excellence which are related to the ends
served by the craft. Ethical lawyering is interpreting the law and applying it

in the representation of one's clients with fidelity to the craft of legal
reasoning in a professional community. The normative ideal of a craft
depends on the assumption that legal interpretation is a process of reasoned
elaboration. Fundamentally, in order to represent a legitimate interpretive
community, a cluster of would-be legal interpreters must be dedicated to the
process of understanding the meaning of legal norms as a reasoned
settlement of normative controversy, not simply as positions that can be
won or lost in a political contest.
To illustrate this argument, return to the example of the FISA case
discussed in Part II.A. One of the remarkable aspects of this story is that
the President decided to continue with the warrantless wiretapping program,
and changed his mind only after Comey, who was serving as acting
Attorney General, threatened to resign, along with then-OLC head Jack
Goldsmith, the director of the FBI, and several top officials at the Justice
Department. 10 0 For the purposes of the discussion of legal interpretation,
imagine the President's legal decision before the threat of mass
resignations. His top legal advisors had concluded that the wiretapping

program was illegal. However, the same office had previously concluded
that the program was legal based on former OLC lawyer John Yoo's
arguments for virtually limitless presidential power. There were lawyers

elsewhere in the executive branch, most notably then-White House Counsel
Alberto Gonzales and David Addington, the legal advisor to Vice-President
Dick Cheney, who continued to believe that the President had authority to

authorize the program.10 ' Therefore, from the President's perspective there
appeared to be a split within the interpretive community-the
Yoo/Addington camp and the Goldsmith/Ashcroft camp--reaching
diametrically opposed interpretations of the governing law. Leaving aside
99. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 143-50 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994). Henry Hart and Albert Sacks talk about attributing a single purpose to a
piece of legislation, but their legal process materials have come to be understood as
embodying the more general point that the law should be understood as a purposive activity.
As David Luban shows in an insightful discussion, Lon Fuller is another legal theorist who
emphasizes the purposive nature of law. See DAVID LUBAN, Natural Law as Professional
Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 44, at 99,
108-09 [hereinafter LUBAN, A Reading of Fuller]. The theory of interpretation I defend here
is indebted substantially to the idea that the purposiveness or goal-directedness of any
practice-what it is all about, so to speak-is a noncircular source of obligations internal to
the practice, because it would be incoherent to claim to be engaging in any activity without
caring about the goods that are internal to that form of activity. MACINTYRE, supra note 39,
at 190-9 1.
100. Richard B. Schmitt, Cheney Is Said to Have Halted Promotion, L.A. TIMES, June 7,
2007, at A 13.
101. Eggen & Kane, supra note 27; Dan Eggen, Official: Cheney Urged Wiretaps,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2007, at A3; Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Cheney Pushed U.S. to
Widen Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, at Al.
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the matter of the competence of a nonlegally trained President to evaluate
these arguments independently, the central question is whether there is any
method for resolving intracommunity interpretive disputes-that is, we are
looking for some principled way to conclude that the Yoo/Addington
interpretation is not the right one.
The only way to avoid begging all of the central questions here is to rely
on a notion of the law and legal advising as a practice, and to seek to derive
from that a set of internal criteria of success or failure in terms of the ends
of the practice. David Luban reads Lon Fuller as proposing something
along these lines.' 0 2 The distinctive feature of Fuller's jurisprudence is that
he defines law not in terms of existence conditions, but as an activity-"the
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules."' 0 3 As
an activity, it can be carried out well or poorly. In Luban's arresting phrase,
10 4
"lawyers can sin against the enterprise in which they are engaged."'
Marking deviations from a well-performed activity is a matter of grasping
the point of the practice to see what sorts of commitments it entails. Law,
in other words, is a purposive activity, and we can give a functional
argument for the ethical obligations that attach to anyone who participates
in it. "[T]o recognize something as a steam engine or a light switch is
already to recognize what it ought to do, to recognize a built-in standard of
success or failure."' 0 5 Similarly, understanding the point of some practice
carries with it the implicit acceptance of internal regulative standards that
enable that practice to aim at its end.
This is a familiar Aristotelian way of thinking, and the objections to it are
just as familiar. Functional arguments place a great deal of analytical
weight on the function we impute to some object or activity. 10 6 In a
standard example in the philosophy of science, how do we know that the
function of the heart is to pump blood, and not to make a thumping sound?
One typical response is to define a function in terms of the proper working
of a system such as a biological organism. But of course this just pushes
the problem back one step, to defining the proper working of something.
Concepts like adaptive fitness can be used to define the proper working of
organisms, but in the case of social practices like law there is not such a
clear external referent that can be used to define the function of the practice.
Fuller says the function of law is subjecting human activity to the

102. See LUBAN, A Reading ofFuller,supra note 99, at 99-130.
103. FULLER, supra note 13, at 106.

104. LUBAN, A Reading of Fuller,supra note 99, at 105.
105. Id. at 109; see also FULLER, supra note 13, at 96 (noting that the natural law
regulating "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules" is
conceptually no different from the natural law of carpentry, as perceived by a carpenter who
is interested in a building not falling down); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW
204-31 (1995) (arguing that interpretation ought to look to whatever rationality is immanent
in a particular mode of ordering).
106. See generally Carl G. Hempel, The Logic of Functional Analysis, reprinted in
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 349 (Michael Martin & Lee C. McIntyre
eds., 1994); Larry Wright, Functions, 82 PHIL. REV. 139 (1973).
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governance of rules, but one might also argue that the function of law is to
ensure that justice is done, protect human rights, 10 7 limit the power of the
state, express the community's public values, 10 8 enable the little guy to
stand up to the big guy and say, "hey, you can't do that to me," 10 9 and so
on. Not surprisingly, I have my own views about the best way to
understand the function of law, but I offer them somewhat tentatively, as a
view about the function of law. If one finds this view attractive, then
certain things follow from it as a matter of the internal normativity of that
practice (which is to say, as principles of legal ethics). If another functional
account seems more attractive, then different internal normative standards
will follow from it.
As mentioned previously, I think the function of the legal system (writ
large, including legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies, as well as
roles or offices within the system, such as lawyer and judge, and rhetorical
practices that constitute the distinctive mode of justification of directives
given by the system) is to enable citizens to establish, using tolerably fair
procedures, a provisional framework for peaceful coexistence and
cooperation, despite the evident fact of deep and persistent disagreement
pertaining to just about everything that otherwise could serve as a
framework.' 10 The set of relevant actors, whose behavior must be
coordinated by the law, includes the government. Thus, it must be possible
to differentiate, as a conceptual matter, between what a government actor
(or the government as a whole) wants to do and what it has a right to do. At
a minimum, we must be able to coherently criticize the directive attributed
to Andrew Jackson, who told his legal advisor that "you must find a law
authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney General who will." 111 The2
problem is that Jackson's stance conflates lawful power with raw power."1
If it means anything, the notion of the rule of law must mean that the
107. See, e.g., Binghamsupranote 13.
108. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 49 (talking in terms of a community of principle, not
public values, but making essentially the same point); Fiss, supra note 18, at 2, 8.
109. One way of understanding the defense of the rule of law is found in E.P. THOMPSON,
WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT

258-69 (1975). I owe the colloquial

formulation to Yasutomo Morigiwa, but he has published it only in Japanese.
110. Cf JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EXPANDED EDITION, at xxvi (rev. ed. 2005)
(noting that it is the very fact of "the absolute depth of... irreconcilable latent conflict" that
makes liberal political institutions necessary).
111. See CLAYTON, supra note 50, at 18 (quoting Andrew Jackson).
112. On the other hand, President Andrew Jackson's statement could be understood as an
appeal to the indeterminacy of law. For a more recent statement along similar lines,
although more clearly an appeal to legal indeterminacy, consider President George W.
Bush's reaction to the Hamdan case, which held that all detainees were covered by Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, proscribing outrages upon human dignity. Bush
responded: "That's like-it's very vague. What does that mean, 'outrages upon human
dignity'? That's a statement that is wide open to interpretation." See Press Release, Office
of the White House Press Secretary, Press Conference of the President (Sept. 15, 2006),
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20060923185835/http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/09/20060915-2.html. The unedited comment is reported in Richard Leiby,
Down a Dark Road: Movie Uses Afghan's Death to Ask Tough Questions About U.S. and
Torture, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2007, at Cl.
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existence of de facto power is not conclusive of the question of whether
power has been exercised rightfully.
This may be starting to sound too abstract to provide much guidance for
lawyers in practice, but it is only abstract when stated as a theoretical
problem. As a description of a practical activity, it is perfectly intelligible.
Identifying good or bad instances of legal reasoning is exactly what lawyers
do. The standards of the lawyering craft resist distillation into summary
form, but experienced lawyers nevertheless can recognize well reasoned
judgments or instances of fallacious argumentation. To continue our
domestic spying example, one can criticize the government lawyers' advice
to the Bush administration, authorizing the warrantless wiretapping
program on the basis of the AUMF and wartime executive power, with
reference to the failure of that advice to cohere with existing law. 113 First
of all, the FISA statute contemplates a situation of war, and permits
warrantless wiretapping during wartime, but only for a limited period of
time. 114 Under ordinary principles of statutory construction,1 15 this specific
limitation on wiretapping in a time of war would control over the general
grant of power in the AUMF. Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that
where Congress has spoken with regard to an issue, the President's
authority is at its lowest ebb, even in wartime. 116 That rule pertains not
only to the open-ended claims of executive power in the lawyers' letter, but
to the interpretation of conflicting statutes, such as the AUMF and FISA.
Congress has acted to regulate the President's authority to conduct
electronic surveillance, and the AUMF does not change that specific
regulation in any way. From the standpoint of proponents of strong
executive power, the AUMF should be seen as redundant in any event, so it
cannot change the regulatory scheme adopted by FISA without specifically
amending FISA. The government lawyers might respond that the President
has the authority to disregard congressional restrictions-at one time the
OLC took that position with respect to prohibitions on torture 117-but the
Justice Department wisely chose not to make that argument in this case,
because it is wholly lacking in legal support.
The FISA example is offered as a case study only, and the point of citing
it is not really to establish a substantive conclusion about that particular
legal issue (although I do think it is accurate to call the OLC lawyers'
113. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Affairs, to Pat Roberts and John D. Rockefeller IV, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence,
and Pete Hoekstra and Jan Harman, House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence (Dec.
22, 2005), reprintedin David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The NationalSecurity Agency's
Domestic Spying Program: Framingthe Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355, 1360-63 (2006).
114. See 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
115. See NORMAN J. SINGER & J. D. SHAMBLE, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
(7th ed. 2008).
116. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
117. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprintedin THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE
ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
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advice deficient). The point is, rather, to illustrate the way one might go
about critiquing government lawyers for failing to live up to their ethical
obligations. Politicized-which is to say unethical-legal advising is that
which cannot be defended with reference to the governing law. Making this
conclusion stick, in turn, is a matter of delving into the governing law,
making and analyzing legal arguments, and relying on the tacit norms of
acceptability to the professional community. The argument against the
Yoo/Addington understanding of FISA and executive power is an internal
one, offered within the practice of legal reasoning. However, the nature of
the craft of lawyering, which is tacitly in view whenever one offers
criticism of a legal argument, is constrained at a deeper level by the value of
legality. This ideal means that reasons given by anyone, whether a private
citizen or the state, must satisfy certain formal criteria such as generality,
prospectivity, clarity, and stability. 118 These criteria may not be cited
directly, but function in the background when there is an argument within
the professional community between factions competing to establish that
one interpretation is the right one. The familiar arguments that lawyers and
legal scholars make back and forth, claiming that some interpretation is
good or bad, are in my view the substance of legal ethics, when we are
considering the role of lawyers as advisors.
CONCLUSION

The right way to theorize the claim that the activities of government
lawyers have become politicized is not to look for evidence of ideological
motivations or overlap between the interests of the President and the way in
which government lawyers exercise discretion. The law itself, not some
notion of neutrality or conformity with the public interest, sets constraints
on what lawyers may do. In order to perform this function, the law must be
interpreted in a way that respects its capacity to bear a substantive meaning.
Lawyers cannot understand their role as merely executing their clients'
preferences; the distinctive function of lawyers is that they act as agents of
their clients, but only within the bounds of the law. Because the meaning of
the law is a function, in part, of the acceptability of the interpretation to a
professional community, the only way to evaluate whether lawyers have
given advice within the bounds of the law is to engage the interpretive
arguments on their own terms. Fortunately, that is something that lawyers
and legal scholars are well-equipped to do. The best response to the
problem of politicization is to seek to strengthen respect for the craft of
lawyering, which supports the capacity of the law to constrain and regulate
the exercise of power.

118. See FINNIS, supra note 13; FULLER, supra note 13; RAz, supra note 19; Bingham,
supra note 13.

